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ABSTRACT 
 
 This research has provided possible explanations to failures experienced in the P-
7-2 Auxiliary Power Plant reduction gearbox as installed on the CH-53E Super Stallion 
and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters.  Ground testing with the rotors static was 
conducted during two separate phases from March 1995 to December 1995.  Reduction 
gearbox loading was measured, resulting in the identification of several detrimental over- 
and transient loads.  Loading reduction techniques are investigated, discussed, and/or 
evaluated for U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps fleet introduction viability. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Back cone angle: the angle of a cone whose elements are tangent to a sphere containing 
a trace of the pitch circle 
 
Bevel gear: an arrangement of bevel wheels for the transmission of motion from one 
shaft to another on intersecting axes 
 
Hypoid bevel gear: a bevel gear with the axes of the driving and driven shafts at right 
angles, but not in the same plane which causes some sliding action between the teeth. 
 
Pitch angle: the angle between the axis of a bevel gear and the pitch cone generator, 
being the complement of the back cone angle 
 
Pitch cones:  the contacting cones of a bevel gear on which the normal pressure 
angles are equal; they are coaxial with the rotation of the gears 
 
Pitch curves: the intersection of the tooth surfaces in the pitch cone 
 
Reference cylinder: in helical and spur gears, the right circular cylinder on which the 
normal pressure angle has a specified standard value 
 
Spiral angle: the angle between the pitch cone generator of a bevel gear and the tangent 
to the tooth trace at the point.  The angle is positive for a right-hand gear. 
 
Spiral bevel crown gear: a gear whose pitch curves are inclined to the pitch element at 
the spiral angle and are usually circular 
 
Straight bevel crown gear: a gear whose pitch curves are straight lines, intersecting at 
the apex.  The spiral angle at any cone distance is zero. 
 
Tooth trace: the line of intersection of the tooth flank with the reference cylinder or 
pitch cone 
 
Tooth flank: that portion of a tooth surface which lies within the working depth 
 
Zerol bevel gear: a spiral bevel gear with curved teeth and having a zero degree mean 
spiral angle. 
 
 
(Sources: G.H.F. Naylor, Dictionary of Mechanical Engineering, 4th Edition, 
Butterworth-Heihemann, Oxford, and the Society of Automotive Engineers, Warrendale, 
PA, 1996.  Philippine Agricultural Engineering Standard PAES 308: 2001, Engineering 
Materials – Straight Bevel Gears for Agricultural Machines – Specifications and 
Applications, Philippine Agricultural Engineering Division, 2001.) 
  1
SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND. 
 
The CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter and its Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) 
derivative, the MH-53E Sea Dragon, pictured in figures 1 and 2 respectively, are both 
equipped with the P-7-2 gas turbine auxiliary power plant (APP) (Jane’s, 1997; DOTE, 
1995).  During the early to mid ‘90s, United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United 
States Navy (USN) units employing these helicopters experienced a number of failures 
occurring in the APP planetary reduction drive assembly, the assembly which transfers 
APP power to the accessory gearbox (AGB). 
 
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) tasked the Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft 
Test Squadron (NRWATS), through the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division 
(NAWCAD), to quantify the loads applied to the APP during the pre-rotor engagement 
ground checks in an attempt to define quantitatively the rotors-static operating conditions.  
Once quantified, causal factors were to be determined and potential corrective measures 
suggested, where possible. 
 
First, a study was made of the differing gear failure modes.  Second, an in-depth analysis 
of the aircraft was completed in order to define the test scope and methodology.  Next, 
  2
 
Figure 1 
CH-53E Super Stallion 
(Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron Internet Web Site Photo Archives) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
MH-53E Sea Dragon 
(U.S. Navy Internet website photograph archives, PH2 Michael Sandberg) 
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testing was conducted; data analyzed; and corrective measures suggested, implemented 
and evaluated, where applicable. 
 
1.2  GEAR FAILURE MODES. 
 
Gear failure modes can be identified by class and type, as indicated in table 1.  In general, 
the classes of wear, scoring, interference, surface fatigue, and plastic flow are not 
immediately catastrophic and will, in many cases, show a progressive trend that can 
ultimately lead to failure.  Fracture, process-related1, and compound failures tend to be 
instantaneous in that little or no indication is given of the impending failure (Drago, 
1988). 
 
1.2.1 Wear. 
Polishing, moderate, and excessive wear are the results of metal-to-metal contact due to 
an inadequate boundary of oil between the gear surfaces.  When relatively hard, large 
particles contaminate the lubricating oil, the gear surfaces will become damaged, or will 
be abrasively worn.  Corrosion, a result of many varying factors, can damage the gear 
faces, magnifying the transmitted loads due to a reduction in surface area.  This 
augmented loading causes the gears to wear more rapidly (Drago, 1988). 
                                                          
1  Only those gears whose manufacture-related damage escapes detection prior to installation are included 
in this discussion. 
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Table 1 
Gear Failure Mode Classes and Types 
Class Type Common Cause(s) 
Wear Polishing Insufficient oil film thickness, surface 
 Moderate roughness, oil contamination 
 Excessive  
 Abrasive  
 Corrosive  
Scoring Frosting Load, sliding velocity, and/ or excessive 
 Light oil temperature that leads to insufficient 
 Moderate oil film thickness. 
 Destructive  
 Localized Non-uniform surface loading. 
Interference N/A Self-explanatory 
Surface Initial Pitting Exceedance of material’s fatigue capacity. 
Fatigue Destructive 
Pitting 
 
 Spalling Combination of high surface velocities and 
stresses. 
 Case Crushing Gear core softness. 
Plastic Cold Flow Insufficient material hardness. 
Flow Hot Flow Insufficient lubrication. 
 Rippling Insufficient material hardness and 
lubrication. 
 Ridging Insufficient oil film thickness and oil 
contamination. 
Fracture Classical Bending 
Fatigue 
High stress. 
 Overload High, unanticipated applied loads. 
 Random Fracture Usually symptomatic of other problems. 
 Root/Rim/Web Insufficient rim thickness. 
 Resonance Self-explanatory 
Process Quench Cracks Improper cooling. 
related Grinding Cracks Improper grinding. 
 Nicks, Scratches, 
and Such 
Improper handling. 
 Electric Arcing Improper welding. 
 Grinding Burns Improper grinding. 
 Improper Edge 
Breaks 
Self-explanatory. 
 Tool Marks Improper finishing. 
Compound N/A Self-explanatory. 
(Source: Raymond J. Drago, Fundamentals of Gear Design, Butterworth Publishers, 
New York, NY, 1988)
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1.2.2 Scoring. 
As with wear, scoring is another condition caused by metal-to-metal contact.  In the cases 
of frosting and light, moderate, and destructive scoring, temperatures build to a point 
such that welding of the surfaces in contact occurs.  The rotation of the gears severs the 
weld.  The severing action and the subsequent, continued rotation scores the gear faces.  
Localized scoring, unlike the other types of scoring, is not attributable to an excessive 
thermal condition, but is surface damage as the result of high localized loading (Drago, 
1988). 
 
1.2.3 Interference. 
Interference manifests itself in many forms, but can generally be attributed to design 
imperfections.  These imperfections can be in the gear tooth itself, in how it is mounted, 
in the choice of material, et cetera (Drago, 1988). 
 
1.2.4 Surface Fatigue. 
Surface fatigue results from the cyclic application of an exceedingly heavy load.  In the 
case of spalling, this loading is combined with “high sliding velocities.”  While pitting 
and spalling occur at the surface and affect a substantial number of teeth, case crushing 
occurs internally in case-hardened gears and damage is generally limited to a very small 
number of teeth.  In all cases, this damage presents itself on the gear’s surface and is 
presented as a pit or a gouge (Drago, 1988). 
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1.2.5 Plastic Flow. 
Gear teeth whose profiles have been altered plastically fall into this failure category.  
Unlike gears subjected to wear, scoring, and fatigue, flowed gears retain the original 
amount of material, in the early stages of failure, but have had their profile permanently 
changed through high loads, material hardness, poor lubrication, sliding, or some 
combination thereof (Drago, 1988). 
 
1.2.6 Fracture. 
Fracture failures are describe a failure in which some part of the gear experiences a crack 
or breakage.  These cracks are the result of excessive load and can be exacerbated by 
other aspects, such as surface fatigue or process-related failures.  As discussed in 
paragraph 1.2, this type of failure tends to be instantaneous and can result in significant 
damage, especially in the cases of root/rim/web and resonance types where major 
portions of the gear can separate (Drago, 1988). 
 
1.2.7 Process Related. 
Process related failures are those failures generally caused during the making of the gear 
(Drago, 1988). 
 
1.2.8 Compound. 
As can be surmised from the title of this mode, compound failures are the result of the 
interaction or progression of several singular types of failures (Drago, 1988). 
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1.3  AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION. 
 
1.3.1 General. 
The H-53E is a dual-piloted, single main rotor helicopter designed and manufactured by 
the Sikorsky Aircraft Division of the United Technologies Corporation.  The aircraft is 
equipped with a seven-bladed main rotor and a four-bladed composite tail rotor.  The 
aircraft has an empty weight of approximately 36,000 pounds with a maximum gross 
weight of either 73,500 pounds (“C” variant) or 69,750 pounds (“M” variant).  USMC 
missions include troop transport as well as internally- and externally-carried heavy lift.  
USN missions consist of AMCM and vertical onboard delivery of cargo and personnel 
(NAVAIR, 1999).  Both variants are equipped with the P-7-2 gas turbine auxiliary power 
plant (APP) (Jane’s, 1997). 
 
1.3.2 Auxiliary Power Plant. 
The aircraft is equipped with an APP mounted forward of the main rotor gearbox (MGB) 
and AGB, as depicted in figure 3.  The APP provides the capability for unassisted ground 
operations by driving the AGB during pre-flight ground checks by allowing the 
generation of electric and hydraulic power.  Additionally, the APP provides in-flight 
AGB power redundancy in the event that the main gearbox (MGB)-to-AGB drive train 
should fail.  The APP is comprised of several subsystems, including, but not limited to, a 
turbine engine, a reduction drive assembly, a clutch, and a control/indicator panel 
(NAVAIR, 1971). 
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Figure 3 
Auxiliary Power Plant/Accessory Gearbox/Main Gearbox Installation 
 
(Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems 
Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance 
Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988)
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1.3.2.1  APP Turbine Engine.  The P-7-2 gas turbine aircraft APP, illustrated in figure 
4, incorporates a single stage centrifugal compressor and a single stage radial inflow 
turbine wheel mounted on a high speed rotor shaft.  Compressed air is mixed with fuel 
and burned in an annular combustor can (NAVAIR, 1971). 
 
1.3.2.2  Reduction Drive Assembly.  The reduction drive assembly, rated for a 
continuously applied load of 110 SHP, is housed in a magnesium casing, incorporates a 
series of ball bearing supported planetary, ring, and Zerol bevel gears to reduce APP 
output RPM from 61,248 to 8,216 on the axial output drive pad.  The reduction drive 
assembly is presented in figure 5.  An oil pump, fuel pump, and electrical generator are 
mounted on the reduction drive assembly (NAVAIR, 1971). 
 
1.3.2.3  APP Oil System.  A pressure-type oil system, incorporating a 10 micron by-
passable filter, lubricates the APP and reduction drive assembly.  Five jets provide 
pressurized oil, regulated between 15 and 40 psi, to the planetary gear/high speed pinion 
input point.  The two remaining jets direct oil at the Zerol bevel gear:  one aimed at the 
pinion/gear mesh point while the other is aimed at the end of the gear shaft and allows oil 
to lubricate the aft rotor shaft roller bearing.  What can be best described as a splash type 
lubrication system provides oil to the rest of the bearings and gears.  An air/oil mist is 
generated by the interaction of the rotating planetary gear/pinion and jet-directed 
pressurized oil.  This mist covers the gears and bearings, cooling and lubricating them 
(NAVAIR, 1971).
  10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Auxiliary Power Plant 
 
(Naval Air Systems Command, Handbook and Maintenance Instructions, Gas Turbine 
Auxiliary Power Plant, Solar Model T-62T-27, NAVAIR Model P-7-2, Part No. 42100-0, 
NAVAIR 19-105B-39, Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, PA, February 
1971)
  11
 
 
Figure 5 
Reduction Drive Assembly 
 
(Naval Air Systems Command, Handbook and Maintenance Instructions, Gas Turbine 
Auxiliary Power Plant, Solar Model T-62T-27, NAVAIR Model P-7-2, Part No. 42100-0, 
NAVAIR 19-105B-39, Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, PA, February 
1971) 
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1.3.2.4  APP Clutch.  A pneumatically operated clutch, using APP compressor bleed 
air, is mounted to the reduction drive assembly and connects the APP to the AGB via a 
drive shaft, as depicted in figures 3 and 6 (NAMTRAGRU, 1988). 
 
1.3.2.5  APP Control/Indicator Panel.  The APP control/indicator panel, shown in 
figure 7, is located in the cockpit on the overhead control panel.  It includes a control 
lever to initiate the start sequence, allow continuous operation, and initiate the shutdown 
sequence; three protective circuit breakers; a protective circuit breaker on/off switch; 
gauges to indicate turbine speed in percent RPM and exhaust gas temperature (EGT) in 
degrees Celsius; and a T-shaped fire-indicating handle which, when moved aft, secures 
the APP and cabin heater and simultaneously discharges a fire retardant in the APP 
compartment.  The protective circuit breakers automatically shut the APP down for 
operations as indicated in table 2.  Certain protective features are bypassed during main 
engine start and when the APP start switch, located on the emergency control panel, is 
moved from “NORM” to “EMER”, as indicated in table 2 (NAMTRAGRU, 1988). 
 
1.3.2.6  APP Operation.  Prior to initiating the APP start sequence, the cockpit flight 
crew completes the pre-start checklist.  In essence, this ensures that all electrical, and to 
the maximum extent possible, hydraulic draw is secured and that the APP start switch is 
in the “NORM” position.  The pre-start checklist directs the crew to ensure that the fire 
indicating handle is forward, that the protective circuit breakers are set, and that the 
protective circuit breaker control switch is in the “ON” position prior to moving the APP 
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Figure 6 
Auxiliary Power Plant Driveshaft 
 
(Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems 
Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance 
Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988)
Accessory Gearbox 
Auxiliary Power Plant 
Auxiliary Power Plant 
Drive Shaft 
Auxiliary Power Plant 
Clutch Assembly 
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Figure 7 
Auxiliary Power Plant Control/Indicator Panel 
 
(Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems 
Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance 
Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
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Table 2 
APP Protective Circuit Breaker Functions 
  Bypassed During: 
 
Title1 
 
Condition2 
Main Engine 
Start Sequence 
APP Start Switch in 
“Emergency Start” 
High EGT EGT>621° Celsius Yes Yes 
Turbine Overspeed Turbine RPM>110% No No 
Low Oil Pressure Oil pressure<6±1 psi Yes Yes 
Notes:  (1)  Turbine overspeed protection and low oil pressure protection are not 
available until the turbine achieves 92% operating RPM. 
   (2)  Operation outside of these parameters will result in APP shutdown, except 
as noted otherwise. 
(Source: Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot 
Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air 
Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
 
 
control lever forward to the “START” position.  When held in the “START” position, 
hydraulic fluid, stored under pressure in an accumulator, is routed to the APP start motor, 
causing the turbine to spin.  The fuel pump, bolted to the reduction drive assembly, draws 
fuel from the aircraft fuel system and routes it to the fuel nozzles where it is mixed with 
compressed air.  This mixture continues into the combustion chamber, where it is ignited 
by a spark plug.  When turbine RPM exceeds starter speed, a starter clutch assembly 
disengages the starter and allows the turbine to freely accelerate.  When the turbine 
reaches 92% operating RPM and EGT reaches 204 degrees Celsius, bleed air from the 
compressor is released to the APP clutch, causing it to engage.  Full engagement is 
indicated when the #1 GEN, #3 GEN, #1 RECT, and #2 RECT lights on the 
caution/warning/advisory are lit.  At this point, the cockpit flight crew return the APP 
control lever to the “RUN” position (NAMTRAGRU, 1988). 
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1.3.3 Accessory Gearbox. 
A series of hydraulic pumps and electrical generators are mounted on the AGB and are 
designed to provide necessary hydraulic and electrical power for ground operations and 
unassisted engine starting, as presented in figure 8 and as noted in table 3.  The AGB is 
powered by the APP through the APP reduction drive and clutch assemblies or by the 
MGB through the MGB-to-AGB drive shaft, depending on main rotor rotational speed 
(Nr).  During ground operations with the APP operating and Nr below 97%, the AGB is 
designed to be powered by the APP.  An overrunning clutch is designed to prevent the 
MGB-to-AGB drive shaft from turning and back-driving the MGB.  After rotor 
engagement, the APP is typically secured when 97% Nr has been achieved, thus 
disengaging the APP clutch and allowing the MGB to power the AGB. 
 
The AGB incorporates two magnetic chip detectors whose purpose is to detect and warn 
of an excessive build-up of metallic particles in the lubricating oil.  The chip detectors 
feature a system dubbed “fuzz burn”, designed to burn away insignificant accumulations 
of metal resulting from normal wear through an electric discharge.  When enough 
significant particles have accumulated, an electrical gap is bridged, illuminating the 
MASTER CAUTION light, the CHIP DETECTED caution light, and the ACCESS GB 
light on the chip locator panel, as depicted in figures 9 and 10 (PMA-261, 1991, 1993). 
 
1.3.3.1  #1 and #3 Generators.  The helicopter incorporates three identical generators 
to supply electrical power to the aircraft.  Each generator is capable of supplying 40 kVA, 
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Figure 8 
Accessory Gearbox 
 
(Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems 
Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance 
Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988)
#3 Generator 
Engine Start 
Hydraulic Pump 
APP Clutch 
#1 Generator
U2 Hydraulic 
Pump Mount 
AGB-to-MGB 
Driveshaft Mount 
(Not shown:  1st Stage and U1 Hydraulic Pumps) 
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Table 3 
H-53E Accessory Gearbox Accessories 
 
 
Aircraft 
Model 
 
 
#1 
Generator 
 
 
#3 
Generator 
 
2nd Stage 
Hydraulic 
Pump 
 
Utility 1 
Hydraulic 
Pump 
 
Utility 2 
Hydraulic 
Pump 
Engine 
Start 
Hydraulic 
Pump 
CH-53E Yes Yes Yes Yes No1 Yes 
MH-53E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note:  As the CH-53E does not perform AMCM, it is not equipped with any AMCM 
mission-specific equipment, to include the utility 2 hydraulic pump. 
(Sources: Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot 
Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air 
Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988.  Janes, 1997) 
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Figure 9 
Caution/Advisory Panel 
 
(Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems 
Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance 
Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
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Figure 10 
Instrument Panel 
 
(Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, 
Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
MASTER CAUTION 
Panel Light 
Chip Locator Panel 
CHIP DETECTED 
Caution Light 
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115/200 volts, 400 Hz, three phase power to its dedicated supervisory panel, whereupon 
it is routed to the various alternating current (AC) buses, rectifiers, and direct 
current(DC) buses.  Power supply requirements for the different configurations of #1 and 
#3 generator employment are shown in table 4 (PMA-261, 1991, 1993). 
 
1.3.3.2  Second Stage Hydraulic Pump.  The second stage hydraulic pump generates 
3,000 pounds per square inch (psi) hydraulic pressure and supplies it to various portions 
of the primary and automatic flight control systems, as illustrated in figure 11.  These 
systems include the second stage of the main rotor and tail rotor primary flight control 
tandem servos2.  Additionally, if servo 1 of the automatic flight control system (AFCS) is 
selected on the AFCS control panel, second stage hydraulic power is routed to all four 
AFCS servos as well as the force augmentation system (FAS) actuator, after being 
reduced to 1,000 psi through a pressure reducer (PMA-261, 1991, 1993). 
 
1.3.3.3  Utility 1 Hydraulic Pump.  The utility 1 hydraulic pump generates 3,000 psi 
hydraulic pressure and supplies it to various flight control and non-flight control systems, 
as shown in figure 12.  Flight control systems receiving hydraulic power from the utility 
1 system include the second stage of the tail rotor primary flight control tandem servo 
and all four of the AFCS servos, as well as the FAS actuator, if servo 2 of the AFCS is 
                                                          
2  The 1st stage hydraulic pump is mounted on the accessory section of the MGB.  With the main rotor 
static, 1st hydraulic pressure is not available to the 1st stage of the main rotor primary flight control tandem 
servos. 
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Table 4 
Power Supply Requirements for Differing Configurations of Generator Employment 
AC Power 
Sources 
 
AC Buses1, 2 
DC Power 
Sources1, 2 
 
DC Buses2, 3 
 
 
 
Condition 
#1 
PRI 
AC 
Bus 
#3 
PRI 
AC 
Bus 
#2A
PRI 
AC 
Bus 
#2B 
PRI 
AC 
Bus 
 
EMER 
AC 
Bus 
#1 
MON 
AC 
Bus 
#3 
MON 
AC 
Bus 
 
 
#1 
RECT 
 
 
#2 
RECT 
#1 
PRI 
DC 
Bus 
#2 
PRI 
DC 
Bus 
#3 
PRI 
DC 
Bus 
 
EMER 
DC 
Bus 
#1 
MON 
DC 
Bus 
#1 Gen 1  1  1   1  1 1 1 1  
#3 Gen  3  3 3    3 2 2 2 2  
#1 +  
#3 Gen 
1 3 1 3 3   1 3 1 2 2 2 1 
Notes: (1)  Numbers indicate generator supplying power to the indicated bus. 
  (2)  Empty columns indicate that the bus or rectifier is unpowered. 
  (3)  Numbers indicate rectifier supplying power to the indicated bus. 
(Source: Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-
3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
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Figure 11 
Simplified Flight Control System Hydraulics 
 
(Source: Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-
3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988)
Sub- 
systems
1st Stage 
Hydraulic 
System 
2nd Stage 
Hydraulic
System 
In flight 
Replenishment 
Utility 1 
Hydraulic
System 
FAS Actuator 
Servo 1 Servo 2
Servo 1 Servo 2
Servo 1 Servo 2
Servo 1 Servo 2
1st Stage 2nd Stage
1st Stage 2nd Stage
1st Stage 2nd Stage
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Aft
Forward
Lateral
Tail Rotor Servo
AFCS
Servos
Main Rotor Servos
Pitch
Collective
Roll
Yaw1,000 
PSI 
3,000 
PSI 
 24 
 
Figure 12 
Simplified Utility 1 Hydraulic System Subsystems 
 
(Source: Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-
3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
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selected on the AFCS control panel.  As in the case of second stage hydraulics, utility 1 
pressure is reduced to 1,000 psi before being routed to the AFCS servos and the FAS 
actuator.  Non-flight control systems receiving hydraulic power from the utility 1 system 
include the APP start accumulators, cargo door and ramp actuators, cargo winch, engine 
start system, landing gear extension and retraction system, main rotor blade/tail pylon 
fold/spread system, main wheel power brakes, and utility hoist.  In the case of the engine 
start system, utility 1 hydraulic fluid, pressurized to 3,000 psi, is routed through the 
engine start pump and is boosted to an overall pressure of 4,000 psi.  A brief statement of 
purpose for these systems follows (PMA-261, 1991, 1993): 
 
 a. The APP start accumulators store hydraulic fluid under pressure for the APP start 
sequence. 
 b. The cargo door and ramp actuators are used to allow the flight crew to open and 
close the cargo door or cargo ramp found in the rear area of the aircraft cabin. 
 c. The cargo winch is mounted in the forward part of the cabin and is used to aid the 
flight crew in loading heavy objects. 
 d. The engine start system allows the main engine to achieve sufficient gas generator 
turbine speed for start. 
 e. The landing gear extension and retraction system function to allow the tricycle 
landing gear to be lowered and raised. 
 f. The main rotor blade/tail pylon fold/spread system function to allow the main 
rotor blades and tail pylon to be folded and spread to reduce area footprint. 
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 g. The main wheel power brakes allow the flight crew to reduce aircraft speed 
during ground operations. 
 h. The utility hoist allows the flight crew to lower and raise up to 600 pounds from 
the hoist mounted just outside and above the personnel door. 
 
1.3.3.4  Utility 2 Hydraulic Pump.  The utility 2 hydraulic system is dedicated to 
providing hydraulic pressure to AMCM-specific mission equipment.  This equipment 
includes the davit, dual- and single-winch pallets, and the tow boom.  The hydraulic 
pump is designed to operate at 3,000 psi, although a now deactivated 3,000 psi-to-1,000 
psi pressure reducer is found on the pump (Powell, 1995).  A brief statement of purpose 
for these items follows (PMA-261, 1991): 
 
 a. The davit is a hydraulically-positioned A-frame and pulley used in the stream and 
recovery of mine hunting devices. 
 b. The dual- and single-winch pallets are used to lower and raise AMCM gear from 
the helicopter to the water and vice versa. 
 c. The tow boom is the pivoting, hydraulically damped point at which AMCM 
towed devices are connected to the helicopter. 
 
1.3.4 Flight Controls. 
 
1.3.4.1  Mechanical Linkages.  The aircraft is equipped with dual conventional cyclic, 
collective, and pedal flight controls.  Cyclic, collective, and yaw pedal inputs are 
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transferred to the main and tail rotor heads via the lower flight control section, AFCS 
servos, mixing unit, and main and tail rotor primary flight control tandem servos, as 
depicted in figure 13.  Movement of the main rotor primary flight control tandem servos 
translates into swashplate assembly displacement.  Swashplate assembly displacement is 
transferred to the main rotor blades by the main rotor pitch change rods, resulting in main 
rotor blade pitch changes.  Tail rotor blade pitch change results from tail rotor pitch beam 
extension and retraction by the tail rotor primary flight control tandem servo which 
translates into tail rotor pitch change by way of pitch links connecting the tail rotor pitch 
beam and pitch change horns (PMA-261, 1991, 1993). 
 
1.3.4.2  Main and Tail Rotor Primary Flight Control Servos.  Three main rotor 
primary flight control tandem servos are connected to the main rotor swashplate and 
provide the required power to cause swashplate assembly displacement.  Each is 
identical, containing a first and second stage piston.  While each stage is capable of 
controlling the main rotor by itself, in most cases both stages are pressurized and work in 
tandem.  The first and second stage hydraulic systems provide power to the first and 
second stages of these servos, respectively.  A single primary flight control tandem servo 
is used to extend and retract the tail rotor pitch beam and has the same capabilities as a 
main rotor primary flight control tandem servo in that a single stage is capable of 
providing the requisite power to change tail rotor blade pitch angle, although normally 
both stages are pressurized.  Unlike the main rotor primary flight control tandem servos, 
hydraulic power is available to both stages of the tail rotor primary flight control tandem 
servo whenever the AGB is active as the first stage of the servo receives hydraulic power 
 28 
 
 
 
Figure 13 
Flight Control System 
 
(Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, 
Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
 29 
from the second stage hydraulic system while the second stage of the servo receives 
hydraulic power from the utility 1 hydraulic system (PMA-261, 1991, 1993). 
 
1.3.4.3  AFCS Servos.  Four AFCS servos are installed in the aircraft, one each for 
pitch channel, roll channel, altitude (or collective) channel, and yaw channel.  Each has 
two stages, only one of which can be pressurized at a time.  When hydraulic power is 
removed from the AFCS servos, they act as a simple mechanical linkage.  When the 
AFCS servos are pressurized, they ease cockpit flight control movement in that cockpit 
flight control forces are reduced.  The FAS actuator is part of the longitudinal, or pitch, 
flight control run and functions to provide pitch-related AFCS functions.  As discussed 
earlier, the first stage of the AFCS servos are powered by the second stage hydraulic 
system while the second stage of the AFCS servos are powered by the utility one 
hydraulic system (PMA-261, 1991, 1993). 
 
1.3.5 Caution/Advisory Panel. 
A caution and advisory panel is mounted on the instrument panel and is designed to warn 
or advise the cockpit flight crew of system failures or unsafe conditions, or certain 
operating conditions, respectively.  The caution/advisory panel is presented in figure 9 
(NAMTRAGRU, 1988). 
 
1.3.6 Main Landing Gear Scissors Switches. 
The H-53E is equipped with tricycle landing gear comprised of a nose gear and two main 
landing gear.  The main landing gear extend and compress on a fluid- and gas-damped 
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shock strut.  Each of the main landing gear incorporates a scissors switch, also known as 
a weight on wheels switch.  One side of the weight on wheels switch is mounted to the 
shock strut housing while the other side is mounted to shock strut.  The switch opens and 
closes with extension and compression of the main landing gear, respectively, and 
functions to engage and disengage certain features of the aircraft’s systems, based on 
whether the aircraft is flying or has landed (NAMTRAGRU, 1988). 
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SECTION II 
METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1  TEST METHODS AND PROCEDURES. 
 
As discussed, NRWATS was initially tasked with defining the rotors-static operating 
conditions of the APP.  Interestingly, USN units flying the MH-53E in the AMCM role 
experienced a statistically higher percentage of failures when compared to USMC units.  
The CH-53E and MH-53E Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 
Program (NATOPS) flight manuals were used to determine a logical series of fleet 
representative ground checks that would be performed by the flight crew prior to rotor 
head engagement to replicate APP loading as experienced during day-to-day fleet 
operations.  These series of checks fell into two categories:  CH/MH-53E common tests 
and MH-53E unique tests, and are presented in the Appendix.  The common checks 
consisted of motoring engines one at a time, folding and spreading the tail rotor pylon, 
spreading and folding the main rotor blades, operating the utility hoist, operating the 
cargo ramp and door, and conducting flight control checks with and without the AFCS 
servos pressurized with hydraulics.  MH-53E unique tests added the requirement for 
AMCM dual winch pallet operations.  Initially, these checks were conducted as solitary, 
finite events.  Where feasible and logical, they were combined to determine the effect that 
multiple, simultaneous checks had on the system. 
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To gather data, the APP driveshaft was instrumented to measure torque and drive shaft 
speed, and the exhaust was instrumented to measure EGT.  Data were recorded on strip 
charts.  Testing was conducted at NRWATS by an H-53 engineering test pilot and two 
mechanical engineers during two separate periods totaling approximately 4.5 hours from 
March 1995 to December 1995.  Initial testing was conducted on MH-53E bureau 
number (BuNo) 162497.  The second set of tests were conducted on MH-53E BuNo 
163054. 
 
2.2  TEST CONFIGURATIONS. 
 
Although the tests were conducted on two different aircraft, the test team did not feel that 
it presented significant differences in data.  MH-53E BuNo 162497 was configured with 
three T64-GE-419 engines and one AMCM dual winch pallet while MH-53E BuNo 
163054 was configured with two T64-GE 416A, one T64-GE-416 engine, and one 
AMCM dual winch pallet (a single winch pallet was not available during the test period).  
The most significant difference between the –416/A and –419 engines is a change in 
turbine and combustion section casing material to allow higher operating temperatures, a 
change in fuel control, and a change in the method of cooling engine oil.  It was felt that 
these differences would not significantly affect the torque required to accelerate the gas 
generator turbine to sufficient operating speed to introduce fuel for engine start.  As a 
result of the first series of tests, MH-53E BuNo 163054 was configured with a switch and 
wire harness assembly that allowed selection and de-selection of the 3,000 psi to 1,000 
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psi depressurization valve located in the utility 2 hydraulic pump in order to measure 
loading differences at lower utility 2 hydraulic system operating pressures. 
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SECTION III 
RESULTS 
 
3.1  DATA. 
 
The results of all phases of testing are presented in the Appendix. 
 
3.1.1 Non-AMCM Checks. 
A comparison of results from similar checks conducted during phases 1 and 2 is 
presented in table 5.  As can be seen with the checks that did not require the flight 
controls to be moved, results between phase 1 and phase 2 were close in terms of 
measured horsepower.  The variations in those checks involving the movement of flight 
controls is reasonable given the difficulty in replicating flight control movement exactly 
from event to event. 
 
Table 5 
Non-AMCM Check SHP Comparison 
  SHP 
Initial Load Concurrent Loads Phase 1(1) Phase 2(2)
Motor #1 Engine AFCS Servo 1 pressurized 93.7 87.7 
Motor #1 Engine AFCS Servo 2 pressurized 96.3 99.4 
Motor #1 Engine Pedal doublet 89.0 96.7 
Motor #1 Engine Cyclic stir 99.5 98.0 
Motor #1 Engine Collective doublet 117.1 126.1 
Motor #1 Engine All flight controls 104.1 114.8 
Notes: (1)  MH-53E BuNo 162497 
  (2)  MH-53E BuNo 163054 
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3.1.2 AMCM Checks. 
A comparison of results from similar checks conducted during phases 1 and 2 is 
presented in table 6 and the Appendix.  The differences in loading between phase 1 
testing and phase 2 testing with the utility 2 pump operating at 3,000 psi are fairly 
significant, but remain fairly consistent. 
 
The AMCM dual winch pallet reeling speed is variable.  Maintenance settings for 
maximum reel-out speeds range from 24 to 30 RPM while maximum reel-in speeds range 
from 30 to 36 RPM.  Once installed in the aircraft, the degree of lever deflection on the 
AMCM winch control pendant determines reeling speed, from zero to its maximum 
setting.  The utility 2 pump will function to meet this hydraulic demand. 
 
NRWATS did not possess AMCM equipment at the time of the tests, requiring the test 
team to borrow dual winch pallets from an operational unit.  Different pallets were used 
during each phase.  As the power required to operate the desired loads remained fairly 
consistent in those checks not requiring flight control movement, it seems reasonable to 
assume that a difference in utility 2 system operating pressures between MH-53E BuNo 
162497 and 163054 as well as differences in power required to operate the phase 1 winch 
pallet and the phase 2 winch pallet would account for the noted SHP disparities. 
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Table 6 
AMCM Check SHP Comparison 
 Concurrent Loads Phase Phase 
Initial Load First Second 1(1) 2(2) 
Utility 2 system on None None 95.4 77.3 
AMCM Winch 
Pallet(3) 
None None 83.1 61.3 
AMCM Winch 
Pallet(3) 
Utility 
hoist 
None 89.0 58.6 
AMCM Winch 
Pallet(3) 
Cargo 
ramp 
None 91.1 -(4) 
AMCM Winch 
Pallet(3) 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
None 93.7 61.3 
AMCM Winch 
Pallet(3) 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Pedal doublet 117.1 84.8 
AMCM Winch 
Pallet(3) 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Cyclic stir 114.5 87.4 
AMCM Winch 
Pallet(3) 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Collective doublet 140.5 105.4 
AMCM Winch 
Pallet(3) 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
All flight controls 142.2 105.4 
Notes: (1)  MH-53E BuNo 162497. 
  (2)  MH-53E BuNo 163054. 
  (3)  Utility 2 system operating pressure was 3,000 psi. 
  (4)  The minimum measurable SHP value at 102% operating RPM was 53.2. 
 
 
3.2  AUXILIARY POWER PLANT OVERLOADS. 
 
Certain simultaneous ground checks applied loads in the APP reduction gearbox which 
exceeded the 110 SHP limit, as presented in table 7 and the Appendix.  The applied loads 
were sinusoidal and in phase with the movement of the flight controls and varied from a 
minimum of 112.3 SHP to a maximum of 142.2 SHP.  Additionally, loads generated 
during flight control checks varied with the rate at which the controls were moved (i.e., 
faster movement equated to higher loading and vice versa). 
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Table 7 
APP Overloads 
  Concurrent Loads Utility 2  
Event Initial Load First Second (3K psi) SHP 
1-8 Motor #1 Engine Collective doublet None Off 117.1 
2-6 Motor #1 Engine Collective doublet None Off 126.1 
2-7 Motor #1 Engine Move all flight controls None Off 114.8 
2-13 Motor #1 Engine Collective doublet None On 128.7 
1-41 AMCM Winch 
Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Pedal 
doublet 
Off 117.1 
1-42 AMCM Winch 
Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Cyclic 
stir 
Off 114.5 
1-43 AMCM Winch 
Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Collective 
doublet 
Off 140.5 
1-44 AMCM Winch 
Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
All flight 
controls 
Off 142.2 
 
 
3.3  AUXILIARY POWER PLANT TRANSIENT LOADS. 
 
Various applied loads in the APP reduction gearbox exhibited spike characteristics 
(infinite slope on time history), with some exceeding 110 SHP.  The applied loads spiked 
from the 53.2 SHP minimum measurable threshold to the values outlined in table 8 and 
the Appendix, and then immediately fell below the minimum measurable threshold. 
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Table 8 
APP Transient Loads 
  Concurrent Loads  
Event Initial Load First Utility 2 SHP 
2-1 APP Clutch 
Engagement 
None Off 122.0 
2-10 Motor #1 
Engine 
AFCS Servo 2 
pressurized 
On/3K psi 109.6 
2-3 Motor #1 
Engine 
AFCS Servo 2 
pressurized 
Off 99.4 
1-5 Motor #1 
Engine 
AFCS Servo 2 
pressurized 
Off 96.3 
1-36 Utility 2 
System on 
None On/3K psi 95.4 
1-4 Motor #1 
Engine 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Off 93.7 
2-16 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
None On/1K psi 80.6 
2-24 Utility 2 
System on 
None On/3K psi 77.3 
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SECTION IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
4.1  OVERLOAD AND TRANSIENT LOAD REDUCTION TECHNIQUES. 
 
Upon completion of each of the test phases, the data were reviewed.  Two things were 
readily evident from the data collected.  First, the power required by the AGB during 
certain operating conditions exceeded the continuous power rating of the APP.  Second, 
certain operating conditions caused an immediate increase in power required which the 
APP met, sometimes in excess of the continuous power rating.  Methods to reduce or 
eliminate these conditions were examined using administrative restrictions.  Additionally, 
engineering changes were examined and/or instituted to mitigate the failure potential. 
 
4.1.1. Administrative Restrictions. 
The NATOPS program includes the publication of flight manuals for each aircraft that is 
part of the Navy’s inventory.  The program allows end users to recommend changes, 
allowing the manual to be updated to “enhance safety and combat effectiveness 
(OPNAV, 2001).”  These changes may modify procedures; may include wording to 
indicate whether a procedure is to be considered mandatory, recommended, or optional3; 
or may highlight critical information through warnings, cautions, or notes.  The definition 
of these is as follows (OPNAV, 2001): 
                                                          
3  These terms are shall, should, or may, respectively. 
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 a. Warning:  An operating procedure, practice, or condition, etc., that may result in 
injury or death if not carefully observed or followed. 
 b. Caution:  An operating procedure, practice, or condition, etc., that may result in 
damage to equipment if not carefully observed or followed. 
 c. Note:  An operating procedure, practice, or condition, etc., that is essential to 
emphasize. 
 
4.1.1.1  Procedural Changes.  Procedural changes generally seek to add, delete, or 
modify standardized checklist items or specific steps in other standardized operations.  
Several options to reduce APP loading through procedural modification were examined. 
 
4.1.1.1.1 Single Generator Operations.  As noted earlier, two generators are located on 
the AGB.  Unlike the hydraulic pumps, generator operation can be controlled from the 
cockpit using an ON and OFF/RESET switch.  Rather than utilizing both the number 1 
and number 3 generators, it might be possible to reduce AGB power required by 
conducting pre-rotor engagement checks using only one of the two generators available.  
This change could be implemented by simply revising the pre-start checklists.  However, 
single generator operations result in the loss of several electrical buses, some of which 
power items required to execute steps called for in the various checklists or which are 
required to safely operate required subsystems.  These systems are listed in tables 9 and 
10.  As such, single generator operations were discarded as a practical alternative. 
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Table 9 
Single Generator Operations Critical Component Loss (#1 Generator Only) 
#1 Generator Operating 
Lost Bus Lost Component Impact 
#2B PRI 
AC 
#2 Engine Fuel 
Flow Gage 
Loss of initial indication of possible main engine 
hot start. 
#2B PRI 
AC 
2nd Stage Heat 
Exchanger Power 
Potential overheating of 2nd stage hydraulic fluid. 
#2B PRI 
AC 
2nd Stage Hydraulic 
Pressure Gage 
Inability to ensure that the 2nd stage hydraulic 
system is operating within normal limits. 
#2B PRI 
AC 
Utility 1 Hydraulic 
Pressure Gage 
Inability to ensure that the utility 1 hydraulic 
system is operating within normal limits. 
#2B PRI 
AC 
Hydraulic Quantity 
Indicator 
Inability to ensure that hydraulic systems are 
serviced with the proper fluid quantity.  Unable to 
monitor hydraulic systems for leaks from the 
cockpit. 
(Source: Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot 
Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air 
Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Single Generator Operations Critical Component Loss (#3 Generator Only) 
#3 Generator Operating 
Lost Bus Lost Component Impact 
#1 PRI 
AC 
Doppler Fan Possible overheating of Doppler compartment. 
#1 PRI 
AC 
#1, #2, and #3 
Engine T5 Gages 
Inability to monitor engine for possible hot start.  
After engine start, unable to monitor engine 
operating temperatures. 
#1 PRI 
AC 
#1 Engine Fuel 
Flow Gage 
Loss of initial indication of possible main engine 
hot start. 
#1 PRI 
AC 
Utility 1 Heat 
Exchanger Power 
Potential overheating of utility 1 hydraulic fluid. 
#2A PRI 
AC 
Utility 2 Heat 
Exchanger Power 
Potential overheating of utility 2 hydraulic fluid. 
(Source: Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot 
Systems Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air 
Maintenance Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
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4.1.1.1.2 Modified Utility 2 Operations.  As noted in table 11 and the Appendix, 
selection of the utility 2 pump during phase 1 and phase 2 testing caused spikes measured 
at 95.4 SHP and 77.3 SHP, respectively.  It was thought that a slower run-up of the utility 
2 pump might lessen this impact and was evaluated during phase 2.  The APP was shut 
down with the utility 2 pump left in the “ON” position.  The APP was then started, 
allowing the utility 2 pump to begin to build pressure at the onset of APP clutch 
engagement.  As can be seen, not only was this method ineffective, it substantially 
increased the SHP spike in comparison with values noted in which the utility 2 pump was 
activated after the APP clutch engagement cycle was complete.  Consequently, a 
procedural change ensuring that the utility 2 pump switch would be placed in the “ON” 
position prior to APP shutdown was discarded. 
 
4.1.1.1.3 Information Highlight.  As noted in table 7 and the Appendix, overload 
conditions were noted with certain combinations of simultaneous ground checks.  As 
such, the author submitted a NATOPS change that was accepted and has been 
 
Table 11 
Procedural Change Load Comparison 
Event Initial Load Utility 2 SHP Comments 
1-36 Utility 2 System on(1) 3K psi 95.4 Spike 
2-24 Utility 2 System on(1) 3K psi 77.3 Spike 
2-1 APP Clutch Engagement Off 122.0 Spike 
2-8 APP Clutch Engagement(2) 3K psi 156.9 Spike 
Note: (1)  The APP clutch was completely engaged and the utility 2 switch 
advanced from “OFF” to “ON”. 
  (2)  The utility 2 switch was left in the “ON” position, allowing the system 
to build pressure while the clutch engaged. 
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incorporated in the MH-53E NATOPS flight manual.  It is restated as follows (Twomey, 
1995): 
 
CAUTION 
With the utility 2 system on prior to 100% Nr, APP maximum 
operating thresholds can be exceeded when combined AGB loads 
(rapid control inputs, engine starter engagement, cargo winch use, 
etc.) are encountered.  Use of the utility 2 system prior to 100% Nr 
shall be minimized and combined AGB loads avoided. 
 
 
4.1.2  Engineering Changes. 
Administrative changes offer many advantages.  These include the ability to rapidly 
incorporate the desired change, the ability to execute these changes at a minimal cost, 
resulting in the ability to incorporate changes with a minimal short-term impact.  
However, administrative changes are difficult to enforce and standardize, and impose 
changes that have a long-term impact in that the restrictions imposed generally will 
remain in-place until the problem is tackled using a different type of solution.  While 
potentially expensive and slow to incorporate, engineering changes offer the ability to 
address the root cause. 
 
As discussed in paragraphs 1.2 through 1.2.8, gear failure modes can be categorized by 
type and by class, with manifestations grouped as either progressive or catastrophic in 
nature.  The engineering changes discussed focus on ways to mitigate these 
manifestations through load reduction techniques, pre-failure identification, or load 
capacity enhancement.
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4.1.2.1  Load Reduction Techniques.  The nature of the failures noted lend credence to 
the assertion that excessive loads may be a major contributor, especially given that the 
MH-53E, with its higher AGB power required, has statistically been subject to a higher 
percentage of problems.  While these loads have not caused widespread catastrophic 
failures, they may contribute to premature wear and subsequent breakdown. 
 
4.1.2.1.1 Utility 2 System Pressure Reduction.  As discussed in paragraph 1.3.3.4, the 
utility 2 hydraulic pump incorporates a 3,000 psi to 1,000 psi pressure reducer.  To 
evaluate the effect that this pressure reduction might have on applied loads, an ON/OFF 
toggle switch and harness assembly was installed on the phase 2 test aircraft that allowed 
the pressure reduction valve to be engaged or disengaged.  The permanent installation, if 
incorporated, would have discarded the toggle switch and instead routed the switching 
mechanism through the weight-on-wheels switch, automatically depressurizing the utility 
2 system upon landing without any further intervention by the cockpit flight crew.  Upon 
takeoff, the utility 2 system would be fully pressurized to 3,000 psi, providing the 
requisite hydraulic power to conduct AMCM operations.  Test results are presented in 
tables 12 and A-2.  As can be seen, APP reduction gearbox loading at 1,000 psi was 
significantly less than at 3,000 psi. 
 
4.1.2.1.2  Overtorque Protection.  A possible engineering change that could be 
instituted would be the installation of a system that would shut the APP down or limit 
reduction gearbox loading in the event that the power required to meet AGB demands
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Table 12 
Utility 2 Pressure Reduction SHP Comparison 
 Concurrent Loads Phase 1(1) Phase 2(1) 
Initial Load First Second U2/3K psi U2/3K psi U2/1K psi Reduction(2) 
Utility 2 system on(3) None None 95.4 77.3 - 24.1(4) 
AMCM Winch Pallet None None 83.1 61.3 80.6 -19.3(5) 
AMCM Winch Pallet Utility hoist None 89.0 58.6 - 5.4(4) 
AMCM Winch Pallet Cargo ramp None 91.1 - - Unknown 
AMCM Winch Pallet AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
None 93.7 61.3 - 8.1(4) 
AMCM Winch Pallet AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Pedal 
doublet 
117.1 84.8 - 31.6(4) 
AMCM Winch Pallet AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Cyclic 
stir 
114.5 87.4 - 34.2(4) 
AMCM Winch Pallet AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Collective 
doublet 
140.5 105.4 64.0 41.4 
AMCM Winch Pallet AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
All flight 
controls 
142.2 105.4 61.3 44.1 
  Notes: (1)  Loading values are peak SHP, unless noted specifically as spike SHP values. 
(2)  Loading reduction computations use the phase two testing values, only. 
(3)  Activation of the utility 2 pump resulted in SHP spikes to the values noted. 
(4)  The minimum measurable shaft horsepower value at 102% rotational speed was 53.2.  The values 
shown indicate the minimum reduction as the actual on the shaft could not be measured by the test 
equipment in use. 
(5)  As noted in table 9, the measured value exhibited came in the form of a spike.  This is believed to have 
been caused by a momentary malfunction of the data gathering equipment. 
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exceeded a pre-determined limit, given that the aircraft was on the ground supported by 
the landing gear.  The installation envisioned is one that would provide automatic 
protection in the event of a continuous overtorque condition.  Two types of protection 
could be provided and include automatic shutdown or torque limiting through intentional 
clutch slippage or fuel flow limitation.  The installation, depending on the type of 
protection provided, would include a re-designed APP-to-AGB driveshaft, speed sensor, 
logic circuitry, an advisory and caution light, associated wiring, and either a circuit 
breaker, revised clutch design, or a fully automated digital engine control (FADEC).  A 
proposed logic flow is presented in figure 14. 
 
A real-time monitor would provide a driveshaft torque and rotational speed indication.  
These values would be processed and converted to a SHP value.  If the aircraft was 
airborne, the system would essentially be inactive.  As discussed previously, the APP is 
normally shut down after Nr is sufficient to drive the AGB at its proper speed.  In general, 
the only time that the APP would be started in flight would be in the event that a problem 
had developed in the MGB-to-AGB drive train.  The only corrective action taken in this 
instance is to start the APP, thus providing power to the AGB in order to regain critical 
subsystem features.  Allowing the system to monitor AGB power required, with the 
subsequent possibility of APP shutdown while in flight, would be inappropriate. 
 
If the aircraft was on deck, the SHP value would then be compared to three different 
thresholds.  Exceeding the lowest of these values would result in the illumination of an 
advisory light, letting the cockpit flight crew know that they were approaching potentially
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Figure 14 
Overtorque Protection Logic Diagram 
Extinguish advisory light 
Extinguish caution light 
Yes 
Yes
Illuminate advisory light 
SHP>105
Qd, Nd 
SHP=KqQdNd 
No
SHP>110 No
Illuminate caution light 
SHP>115
No 
Yes
Yes
Yes 
Is the APP Emergency Start Switch in “EMER” 
Is the engine start sequence in progress 
Overtorque protection
Yes
Yes
No
No
Has the timer started
Is time>0.5 seconds 
Start timer 
Reset timer 
Yes
No
No
Yes
Is the aircraft 
airborne 
No
Yes 
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damaging reduction gearbox loading.  Exceeding the middle value would result in the 
illumination of a caution light, warning the cockpit flight crew that they were applying 
damaging loads to the reduction gearbox.  Exceeding the highest value for a short period 
of time would result in overtorque protection, given that the engine start cycle was not in 
progress nor was the APP start switch in the emergency, or EMER, position.  The time 
delay was incorporated to account for transient overloads, such as APP clutch 
engagement. 
 
The overtorque protection while the emergency start switch is in the EMER position is 
based on the fact that this is a conscious act and assumes that there was a justifiable 
impetus behind it.  Bypassing the protection during engine start is necessary to preclude 
premature interruption of engine start system hydraulic pressure, which could result in a 
damaging main engine hot start.  Regardless, the stepped indications would still be given 
in the event that a pre-determined threshold had been exceeded. 
 
Overtorque protection, if initiated, could be manifested through shutdown or torque 
limiting.  Automatic shutdown would be accomplished in the same manner as 
experienced during overspeed, low oil pressure, or high exhaust temperature conditions.  
Torque limiting could be used to limit the applied load to the reduction gearbox.  
Inducing APP clutch slippage could be initiated and controlled through a re-design of the 
clutch mechanism.  This method, when used in other applications, generally results in 
excessive heat build-up and reduced clutch life (Cameron, 2000).  Additionally, power 
production could be controlled by replacing the APP fuel control with a fully automated 
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digital engine control, or FADEC.  Exceeding the preset values would result in fuel flow 
limiting, thus limiting horsepower production. 
 
4.1.2.2. Pre-failure Identification.  Pre-failure identification is not a method that 
attempts to extend the life of the APP.  Rather, it is a way to alert personnel that 
something potentially catastrophic might occur so that they can initiate corrective action 
before equipment is damaged or personnel sustain injury.  Examples of this process 
include periodic and real-time monitoring. 
 
4.1.2.2.1 Chip Lights and Oil Monitoring.  As gears and bearings wear, metallic 
particles become suspended in the lubricating oil.  Drago notes, in reference to metallic 
contamination monitoring, that “critical systems should always incorporate such 
devices”.  These devices might include chip detectors and magnetic drain plugs (Drago, 
1988). 
 
With the exception of the APP, all engines and transmissions on the H-53E incorporate 
magnetic chip detectors (NAMTRAGRU, 1988).  The installation of chip detecting 
system would require the addition of a magnetic chip detector in the bottom of the oil 
sump; a power source routed to the caution/advisory panel and chip locator panel; an 
APP SUMP light on the chip locator panel; and associated wiring.  Bridging the electrical 
gap would cause the MASTER CAUTION, CHIP DETECTED, and APP SUMP lights to 
illuminate, as depicted in figure 15, providing an early indication of potential problems
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Figure 15 
APP Chip Detection Warning 
 
(Naval Air Maintenance Training Group, Student Guide for MH-53E Pilot Systems 
Familiarization Course, C-2C-3443, Section IV Diagrams, Naval Air Maintenance 
Training Group, Norfolk, VA, August 1988) 
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within the APP.  Given the impact of such an indication, the added expense and 
complexity of a fuzz burn capability to preclude false indications of impending failure as 
a result of the gap being bridged does not seem warranted. 
 
Additionally, all transmissions and engines have their respective oils sampled and 
analyzed at 50 or 100 hour intervals, again, with the exception of the APP.  Samples are 
taken after the specific systems have been run long enough to bring the oil up to 
operating temperature.  They are then shut down, the reservoirs are opened, a tube is 
inserted, and a small portion of the lubricant is extracted.  The extraction is sent off to a 
lab for analysis.  The analysis results are then sent back to the squadron.  Maintenance 
action is taken, if necessary, based on the results of the analysis. 
 
4.1.2.2.2 Health and Usage Monitoring System.  Zakrajsek, Handschuh, and Decker 
note that one of the few options available to reliably monitor dynamic components is 
through the use of an on-line Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) (Zakrajsek, 
Handschuh, and Decker, 1994).  In their study, a spiral bevel gear and pinion set, seen 
commonly in helicopters, was instrumented with an accelerometer feeding data into a 
real-time computer monitor, which in turn processed the frequency data for fault 
detection and progression.  Interestingly, small variations in load and speed had a 
noticeable affect on the system’s ability to reliably process the measured data.  As such, 
they recommend that the two most promising fault detection algorithms be modified to 
reliably process data in spite of these fluctuations. 
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The incorporation of such a system on the H-53E to monitor the APP would have to 
include the same items noted in Zakrajsek, Handschuh, and Decker’s study.  
Additionally, the requirement to be able to download and analyze the health data at the 
squadron level using existing computing capabilities would have to be ensured.  Lastly, a 
reliable database to determine APP health would have to be established to preclude 
unnecessary maintenance action4. 
 
4.1.2.3  Upgraded Reduction Gearbox Assembly.  Upgrading the reduction gearbox 
assembly to meet the power demands of the AGB subsystems is another option available 
to avoid future failures.  Redesigning the gear faces to a design that betters handles 
applied loads is one potential solution.  For example, Townsend notes that like-sized 
spiral bevel gears are generally better suited to high loads than either straight bevel or 
Zerol bevel gears (Townsend, 1962).  Additionally, altering gear material, altering gear 
hardness, altering post-production inspection criteria, or a combination thereof are all 
methods available to avoid gearbox failure. 
 
4.2  RECOMMENDATIONS. 
 
The H-53E model helicopter is “mature”, meaning that it has been through all its 
developmental and operational test phases and all the planned airframe purchases have 
been completed.  Deficiencies noted during testing have been categorized from major to 
                                                          
4  The H-53E was chosen as the airframe to “lead the fleet” for HUMS integration.  As of this writing, 
testing is still ongoing. 
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minor.  Funding to address these deficiencies is generally allocated along these same 
lines.  This fact was a major factor in choosing which alternatives are best suited to 
address the problem. 
 
  a. As has been noted, the caution discussed in paragraph 4.1.1.1.3 has been 
incorporated into the MH-53E NATOPS manual as an initial measure.  It was the most 
expeditious and most cost effective way to alert units operating the MH-53E of the 
potential causal factors behind APP failures and to potentially preclude them from 
overloading the reduction gearbox.  To date, it has been the only fleet-wide action taken. 
 
  b. In examining the loading conditions, it is apparent that the simultaneous 
operation of utility 2 and other systems can result in overloads.  The decrease in APP 
reduction gearbox loading while operating the utility 2 system at 1,000 psi, if 
incorporated, would allow flight crews to conduct simultaneous ground checks, resulting 
in reduced on-deck time and greater mission flexibility.  Additionally, one would expect 
an increase in APP life due to the reduced exposure to loads above its design limit.  The 
cost of such a system should be minimal, given that the majority of the installation piggy-
backs on installed equipment, specifically the depressurization valve and the weight-on-
wheels switch, and the fact that only MH-53E aircraft would be subject to this 
installation5.  Due to the simplicity, one would expect the incorporation to be quickly 
accomplished and straightforward.  It is, therefore, a recommended solution. 
                                                          
5  There are nearly 4 times as many Super Stallions as Sea Dragons. 
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  c. Overtorque protection offers several advantages over reduced utility 2 
pressure operations.  It would provide an indication of and protection from overload 
conditions during all ground operations, regardless of aircraft type/model/series, be it 
MH-53E or CH-53E.  However, it is a more complex system and would in all likelihood 
be expensive.  Additionally, it would result in the temporarily loss of the aircraft while 
the installation was completed, would temporarily result in a non-standard mix of aircraft 
at the squadron level, and would increase the level of required maintenance.  The 
increased long-term maintenance impact might be mitigated by the reduction in APP and 
AGB repairs.  Still, it is not a practical solution given today’s fiscal environment and is 
therefore not recommended. 
 
  d. APP oil sampling and analysis is a simple way to identify the build-up of 
metal in the lubricating system, providing a means of predicting gearbox failure.  It 
should be incorporated into the oil monitoring program. 
 
  e. Installing a magnetic drain plug or a chip detector system is not considered 
necessary.  As noted, the H-53E fleet has been chosen for the installation of HUMS.  This 
system should be adequate, given the development of an accurate failure detection and 
progression database, to warn of impending problems.  The modification of the APP to 
include a magnetic drain plug and chip detection system is therefore not recommended.  
If HUMS is not procured, the chip detector system, as previously described, should be 
reconsidered. 
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f. Given the long-lead nature of the procurement and upgrade process, limited 
resources, competing engineering issues, and the life of the H-536 program, upgrading the 
reduction gearbox with new or improved gearing is seen as the least viable alternative.  In 
view of the aforementioned recommendations and in light of the planned procurement of 
HUMS, it is not recommended. 
 
                                                          
6  The last H-53E was delivered to HMX-1 in 1996.  The assembly line has since been closed down. 
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SECTION V 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this report was to investigate possible causal factors behind failures in the 
APP reduction gearbox.  Testing was conducted to define the operating environment of 
the APP while it was the sole source of power for the AGB.  Test methods were derived 
by examining CH-53E and MH-53E NATOPS flight manuals to determine a logical 
series of fleet representative ground checks that would be performed by the flight crew 
prior to rotor head engagement to replicate APP loading as experienced during day-to-
day fleet operations.  Two categories of tests were identified, specifically CH/MH-53E 
common tests and MH-53E unique tests.  The test aircraft were configured with an 
instrumented APP driveshaft to measure torque and drive shaft speed, and an 
instrumented exhaust to measure EGT.  Data were recorded on strip charts.  Data were 
reduced and examined to identify solutions to overload and detrimental transient load 
conditions noted.  Finally, a series of changes designed to preclude future APP reduction 
gearbox failures were examined. 
 
The changes identified fell into two categories:  administrative and engineering.  While 
administrative changes offer advantages in terms of lower expense and quick 
introduction, they can be difficult to enforce and standardize, and have a long-term 
impact on fleet operations.  Engineering changes, on the other hand, would allow the fleet 
pilot to conduct “business as usual”, but tend to incur added expense and can take longer 
to introduce. 
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Of the changes identified, the two most viable options are a combination of 
administrative and engineering changes.  First, the caution statement recommended by 
the author, as noted in paragraph 4.1.1, was chosen by NAVAIR as the first step in 
correcting the identified deficiency.  Second, the simplicity and low cost of the utility 2 
pressure reduction switch, especially in view of it’s beneficial impact on gearbox loading 
as identified during the test program, made it the next choice.  Additionally, APP oil 
sampling and analysis was recommended by the author for incorporation with current 
items included in the H-53E oil analysis program.  Lastly, with the planned procurement 
by NAVAIR of a HUMS, the other oil monitoring items as well as upgrading the 
reduction gearbox redesigned internal components were not recommended. 
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Table A-1 (1 of 4) 
Phase 1 Test Results (MH-53E BuNo 162497) 
  Concurrent Loads  Speed    
Event Initial Load First Second Torque RPM % SHP EGT Comments 
1 Motor Engine #1 None None 610 8,250 100.4 79.8 776 Peak 
2 Motor Engine #2 None None 610 8,250 100.4 79.8 742 Peak 
3 Motor Engine #3 None None 605 8,250 100.4 79.2 742 Peak 
4 Motor Engine #1 AFCS Servo 1 pressurized None 720 8,200 99.8 93.7 742 Spike 
5 Motor Engine #1 AFCS Servo 2 pressurized None 740 8,200 99.8 96.3 742 Spike 
6 Motor Engine #1 Pedal doublet None 680 8,250 100.4 89.0 742 Peak 
7 Motor Engine #1 Cyclic stir None 760 8,250 100.4 99.5 776 Peak 
8 Motor Engine #1 Collective doublet None 900 8,200 99.8 117.1 809 Peak 
9 Motor Engine #1 All flight controls None 800 8,200 99.8 104.1 809 Peak 
10 Pylon Fold/Spread None None - 8,450 102.8 - 675 Note (5) 
11 Pylon Fold/Spread Cargo ramp None - 8,400 102.2 - 675 Note (5) 
12 Pylon Fold/Spread Utility hoist None - 8,400 102.2 - 675 Note (5) 
13 Pylon Fold/Spread Cargo ramp Utility hoist - 8,450 102.8 - 641 Note (5) 
14 Blade Fold/Spread None None - 8,400 102.2 - 641 Note (5) 
15 Blade Fold/Spread Cargo ramp None - 8,500 103.5 - 641 Note (5) 
16 Blade Fold/Spread Utility hoist None 480 8,250 100.4 62.8 708 Peak 
Notes: (1) Conditions:  28 March 1995; OAT: +1 C; Hp: -30 ft. 
   (2) APP Specifications: SN: S424620; model: T-62-T-27; type: 42100-0; time since new:  819 hrs; time since overhaul:  241 hrs; 
overhaul: May 1992; installed: 26 June 1992; starts: 3,076. 
   (3) SHP limit was 110. 
   (4) EGT limit was 1149.8° F. 
   (5) Torque for this event was below the 400 in.-lb MMT. 
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Table A-1 (2 of 4), continued 
  Concurrent Loads  Speed    
Event Initial Load First Second Torque RPM % SHP EGT Comments 
17 Blade Fold/Spread Cargo ramp Utility hoist - 8,400 102.2 - 641 Note (5) 
18 Utility Hoist None None - 8,400 102.2 - 675 Note (5) 
19 Cargo Ramp None None - 8,500 103.5 - 641 Note (5) 
20 Cargo Ramp Utility hoist None - 8,450 102.8 - 641 Note (5) 
21 Cargo Ramp AFCS Servo 1 pressurized None - 8,400 102.2 - 641 Note (5) 
22 Cargo Ramp AFCS Servo 2 pressurized None - 8,400 102.2 - 641 Note (5) 
23 Cargo Ramp Motor #1 engine None 640 8,250 100.4 83.8 776 Peak 
24 Cargo Ramp Pedal doublet None - 8,400 102.2 - 641 Note (5) 
25 Cargo Ramp Cyclic stir None - 8,350 101.6 - 641 Note (5) 
26 Cargo Ramp Collective doublet None 460 8,300 101.0 60.6 675 Peak 
27 Cargo Ramp All flight controls None - 8,300 101.0 - 641 Note (5) 
28 Cargo Ramp Pedal doublet AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
420 8,400 102.2 56.0 641 Peak 
29 Cargo Ramp Cyclic stir AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
- 8,300 101.0 - 641 Note (5) 
30 Cargo Ramp Collective doublet AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
480 8,250 100.4 62.8 675 Peak 
 Notes: (1) Conditions:  28 March 1995; OAT: +1 C; Hp: -30 ft. 
   (2) APP Specifications: SN: S424620; model: T-62-T-27; type: 42100-0; time since new:  819 hrs; time since overhaul:  241 hrs; 
overhaul: May 1992; installed: 26 June 1992; starts: 3,076. 
   (3) SHP limit was 110. 
   (4) EGT limit was 1149.8° F. 
   (5) Torque for this event was below the 400 in.-lb MMT. 
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Table A-1 (3 of 4), continued 
  Concurrent Loads  Speed    
Event Initial Load First Second Torque RPM % SHP EGT Comments 
31 Cargo Ramp All flight controls AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
460 8,300 101.0 60.6 675 Peak 
32 Cargo Winch All flight controls AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
460 8,300 101.0 60.6 675 Peak 
33 Utility Hoist AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
None  8,450 102.8  641 Note (5) 
34 Utility Hoist Motor #2 engine AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
620 8,200 99.8 80.7 742 Peak 
35 Utility Hoist All flight controls AFCS Servo 
1 pressurized 
460 8,300 101.0 60.6 641 Peak 
36 Utility 2 
System on 
None None 720 8,350 101.6 95.4 641 Spike 
37 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
None None 620 8,450 102.8 83.1 641 Peak 
38 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
Utility hoist None 680 8,250 100.4 89.0 776 Peak 
39 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
Cargo ramp None 700 8,200 99.8 91.1 809 Peak 
40 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
None 720 8,200 99.8 93.7 809 Peak 
41 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Pedal doublet 900 8,200 99.8 117.1 843 Peak 
 Notes: (1) Conditions:  28 March 1995; OAT: +1 C; Hp: -30 ft. 
(2) APP Specifications: SN: S424620; model: T-62-T-27; type: 42100-0; time since new:  819 hrs; time since overhaul:  241 hrs; 
overhaul: May 1992; installed: 26 June 1992; starts: 3,076. 
(3) SHP limit was 110. 
(4) EGT limit was 1149.8° F. 
(5) Torque for this event was below the 400 in.-lb MMT. 
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Table A-1 (4 of 4), continued 
  Concurrent Loads  Speed    
Event Initial Load First Second Torque RPM % SHP EGT Comments 
42 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Cyclic stir 880 8,200 99.8 114.5 843 Peak 
43 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Collective 
doublet 
1,080 8,200 99.8 140.5 944 Peak 
44 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Move all 
flight controls 
1,100 8,150 99.2 142.2 944 Peak 
 Notes: (1) Conditions:  28 March 1995; OAT: +1 C; Hp: -30 ft. 
(2) APP Specifications: SN: S424620; model: T-62-T-27; type: 42100-0; time since new:  819 hrs; time since overhaul:  241 hrs; 
overhaul: May 1992; installed: 26 June 1992; starts: 3,076. 
(3) SHP limit was 110. 
(4) EGT limit was 1149.8° F. 
(5) Torque for this event was below the 400 in.-lb MMT.
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Table A-2 (1 of 4) 
Phase 2 Test Results (MH-53E BuNo 163054) 
  Concurrent Loads  Speed    
 
Event 
 
Initial Load 
 
First 
 
Second 
Utility 2 
System 
 
Torque 
 
RPM 
 
% 
 
SHP 
 
EGT 
 
Comments 
1 APP Clutch 
Engagement 
None None Off 910 8,450 102.8 122.0 826 Spike 
2 Motor #1 
Engine 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
None Off 660 8,370 101.9 87.7 859 Peak 
3 Motor #1 
Engine 
AFCS Servo 2 
pressurized 
None Off 750 8,350 101.6 99.4 876 Spike 
4 Motor #1 
Engine 
Pedal doublet None Off 730 8,350 101.6 96.7 910 Peak 
5 Motor #1 
Engine 
Cyclic stir None Off 740 8,350 101.6 98.0 944 Peak 
6 Motor #1 
Engine 
Collective 
doublet 
None Off 960 8,280 100.8 126.1 960 Peak 
7 Motor #1 
Engine 
Move all 
flight controls 
None Off 870 8,320 101.3 114.8 960 Peak 
8 APP Clutch 
Engagement 
None None On/ 
3,000 psi 
1,170 8,450 102.8 156.9 977 Spike 
9 Motor #1 
Engine 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
None On/ 
3,000 psi 
710 8,350 101.6 94.1 876 Peak 
 Notes: (1) Conditions: 30 November 1995; OAT: +6C; Hp: -200 ft. 
(2) APP Specifications: SN: 834809; model: T-62-T-27; type: 42100-0; time since new: unknown; time since 
overhaul: 82.8 hrs; overhaul:  6 September 1994; installed: 6 September 1994; starts:  233 since overhaul. 
(3) SHP limit was 110. 
(4) EGT limit was 1149.8° F. 
(5) Torque for this event was below the 400 in.-lb MMT. 
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Table A-2 (2 of 4), continued 
  Concurrent Loads  Speed    
 
Event 
Initial 
Load 
 
First 
 
Second 
Utility 2 
System 
 
Torque 
 
RPM 
 
% 
 
SHP 
 
EGT 
 
Comments 
10 Motor #1 
Engine 
AFCS Servo 2
pressurized 
None On/ 
3,000 psi 
830 8,325 101.3 109.6 910 Spike 
11 Motor #1 
Engine 
Pedal doublet None On/ 
3,000 psi 
750 8,350 101.6 99.4 927 Peak 
12 Motor #1 
Engine 
Cyclic stir None On/ 
3,000 psi 
580 8,350 101.6 76.8 960 Peak 
13 Motor #1 
Engine 
Collective 
doublet 
None On/ 
3,000 psi 
980 8,280 100.8 128.7 1,011 Peak 
14 Motor #1 
Engine 
All flight 
controls 
None On/ 
3,000 psi 
850 8,325 101.3 112.3 994 Peak 
 
15 Utility 2 
system On 
None None On/ 
1,000 psi 
- 8,450 102.8 - 744 Note (5) 
16 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
None None On/ 
1,000 psi 
605 8,400 102.2 80.6 778 Spike 
17 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
Utility hoist None On/ 
1,000 psi 
- 8,450 102.8 - 743 Note (5) 
18 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
Cargo ramp None On/ 
1,000 psi 
- 8,450 102.8 - 777 Note (5) 
Notes:  (1) Conditions: 30 November 1995; OAT: +6C; Hp: -200 ft. 
(2) APP Specifications: SN: 834809; model: T-62-T-27; type: 42100-0; time since new: unknown; time since 
overhaul: 82.8 hrs; overhaul:  6 September 1994; installed: 6 September 1994; starts:  233 since overhaul. 
(3) SHP limit was 110. 
(4) EGT limit was 1149.8° F. 
(5) Torque for this event was below the 400 in.-lb MMT. 
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Table A-2 (3 of 4), continued 
  Concurrent Loads  Speed    
 
Event 
Initial 
Load 
 
First 
 
Second 
Utility 2 
System 
 
Torque 
 
RPM 
 
% 
 
SHP 
 
EGT 
 
Comments 
19 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1
pressurized 
None On/ 
1,000 psi 
- 8,400 102.2 - 777 Note (5) 
20 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1
pressurized 
Pedal 
doublet 
On/ 
1,000 psi 
- 8,400 102.2 - 777 Note (5) 
21 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1
pressurized 
Cyclic 
stir 
On/ 
1,000 psi 
- 8,450 102.8 - 777 Note (5) 
22 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1
pressurized 
Collective 
doublet 
On/ 
1,000 psi 
480 8,400 102.2 64.0 811 Peak 
23 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1
pressurized 
All flight 
controls 
On/ 
1,000 psi 
460 8,400 102.2 61.3 811 Peak 
24 Utility 2 
System On 
None None On/ 
3,000 psi 
580 8,400 102.2 77.3 777 Spike 
25 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
None None On/ 
3,000 psi 
460 8,400 102.2 61.3 811 Peak 
26 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
Utility hoist None On/ 
3,000 psi 
440 8,400 102.2 58.6 844 Peak 
27 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
Cargo ramp None On/ 
3,000 psi 
- 8,450 102.8 - 811 Note (5) 
 Notes: (1) Conditions: 30 November 1995; OAT: +6C; Hp: -200 ft. 
(2) APP Specifications: SN: 834809; model: T-62-T-27; type: 42100-0; time since new: unknown; time since 
overhaul: 82.8 hrs; overhaul:  6 September 1994; installed: 6 September 1994; starts:  233 since overhaul. 
(3) SHP limit was 110. 
(4) EGT limit was 1149.8° F. 
(5) Torque for this event was below the 400 in.-lb MMT. 
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Table A-2 (4 of 4), continued 
  Concurrent Loads  Speed    
 
Event 
Initial 
Load 
 
First 
 
Second 
Utility 2 
System 
 
Torque 
 
RPM 
 
% 
 
SHP 
 
EGT 
 
Comments 
28 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
None On/ 
3,000 psi 
460 8,400 102.2 61.3 811 Peak 
29 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Pedal 
doublet 
On/ 
3,000 psi 
640 8,350 101.6 84.8 878 Peak 
30 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Cyclic 
stir 
On/ 
3,000 psi 
660 8,350 101.6 87.4 878 Peak 
31 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
Collective 
doublet 
On/ 
3,000 psi 
800 8,300 101.0 105.4 946 Peak 
32 AMCM 
Winch Pallet 
AFCS Servo 1 
pressurized 
All flight 
controls 
On/ 
3,000 psi 
800 8,300 101.0 105.4 946 Peak 
 Notes: (1) Conditions: 30 November 1995; OAT: +6C; Hp: -200 ft. 
(2) APP Specifications: SN: 834809; model: T-62-T-27; type: 42100-0; time since new: unknown; time since 
overhaul: 82.8 hrs; overhaul:  6 September 1994; installed: 6 September 1994; starts:  233 since overhaul. 
(3) SHP limit was 110. 
(4) EGT limit was 1149.8° F. 
(5) Torque for this event was below the 400 in.-lb MMT.
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